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ANOTHER WORD ON THE PRESIDENT’S 
STATUTORY AUTHORITY OVER AGENCY 
ACTION 
Nina A. Mendelson* 
  
 
By delegating to the “Secretary” or the “Administrator,” has Congress 
indicated an intent regarding presidential control of executive branch 
agencies?  This seemingly simple interpretive question has prompted 
significant scholarly debate.1
“Directive” authority might be understood to cover the following 
situation:  the President tells the agency head, “You have prepared materials 
indicating that options A, B, and C each satisfies statutory constraints and 
could be considered justified on the agency record.  The Administration’s 
choice will be Option A.”  The President could, of course, offer a reason—
perhaps Option A is the least paternalistic, most protective, or most 
innovation-stimulating of the three.  If the option preferred by the President 
otherwise complies with substantive statutory requirements on the record 
prepared by the agency,
  In particular, if the statute names an 
executive branch agency head as actor, can the President be understood to 
possess so-called “directive” authority? 
2
A number of scholars have argued that statutory delegation to an 
executive branch agency official means that “the President cannot simply 
 the question is whether the statutory reference to 
“Administrator” or “Secretary” should be understood as a limit on the 
President’s authority to direct the executive branch agency official to act in 
a particular way.  
 
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.  Thanks for valuable discussion 
and comments especially to Kevin Stack, as well as to Philip Harter, Riyaz Kanji, Sallyanne 
Payton, Peter Strauss, and participants in symposia at Fordham Law School and Cardozo 
Law School. 
 1. I take no position on whether the Constitution might be read to compel presidential 
decisional authority. See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The 
President’s Power To Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 549–50 (1994); Lawrence 
Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2–3 
(1994); Peter L. Strauss, Foreword:  Overseer, or “The Decider”?  The President in 
Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 702–03 (2007). 
 2. Beyond “directive authority” is the case in which the President has a rule and 
supporting record developed, prepared, and written within the White House and then orders 
the agency, without more, to publish it.  Although an agency official might have executed 
the Federal Register notice, such action would appear to leave the agency no meaningful role 
whatsoever.  Whatever Congress’ specific intent, this would be hard to square with the 
language of a simple delegation.   
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command or direct an agency head to issue a regulation.”3  These same 
scholars generally concede that the President may oversee and substantially 
influence agency decisions, such as by prompting agencies to prioritize 
particular problems or to coordinate with and take account of another 
agency’s concerns.  Their position that more aggressive direction is 
precluded by statute has practical implications that are not fully clear.  It 
changes little, for example, about the President’s recourse against a 
recalcitrant agency official.  Her primary recourse—whether the statute says 
“Administrator,” “Secretary,” or “President”—remains removal from 
office,4 and she may have other tools as well.5  Outside the area of national 
security and foreign relations,6 and within the arena of domestic policy, the 
President is highly unlikely to, say, issue a rule in lieu of the agency head 
even if the statute says “President.”7
So what difference does the answer to the question make?  If the 
President generally possesses directive authority over executive agency 
officials even when the statute’s delegation of authority is to the 
“Administrator” or the “Secretary,” it may reduce the need to reach the 
arguments of unitary executive theorists that the Constitution requires such 
authority.
 
8
Beyond this, other commentators have argued that the primary difference 
it makes is in attitude.  If the President’s role is improperly 
mischaracterized as the “Decider,” Professor Peter Strauss’s term, an 
agency official might be prompted to discount the agency’s own view of the 
proper decision and, within statutory bounds, feel committed to follow the 
 
 
 3. Thomas O. Sargentich, The Emphasis on the Presidency in U.S. Public Law:  An 
Essay Critiquing Presidential Administration, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 7 (2007); accord 
Strauss, supra note 1, at 759 (“If [statutory] text chooses between President as overseer of 
the resulting assemblage, and President as necessarily entitled ‘decider,’ the implicit 
message is that of oversight, not decision.”). 
 4. See Sargentich, supra note 3, at 7; Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory 
Powers To Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 293–96 (2006); Strauss, supra 
note 1, at 716.  Professor Kevin Stack’s position amplified one also noted by Professor 
Robert V. Percival. See Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative 
State:  The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 1008 (2001) (noting express 
presidential authority over agency decisions in some statutes but not others). 
 5. See, e.g., Sargentich, supra note 3, at 8 (noting importance of “stay[ing] on the good 
side of White House officials”). 
 6. See infra notes 79–82 and accompanying text. 
 7. See infra notes 38–46 and accompanying text (bureaucratic obstacles likely to 
preclude President from signing Federal Register notices even if statute delegates authority 
to President; noting President has only rarely signed such a notice since 1981). 
 8. Stack has pointed out that if a simple delegation is understood to limit presidential 
directive authority, unitary executive advocates must apply the constitutional avoidance 
doctrine to argue that the statutes nonetheless permit presidential direction or else argue that 
the statutes are unconstitutional. Stack, supra note 3, at 299 (“This conclusion forces 
proponents of a strongly unitary executive to invoke constitutional avoidance principles.”).  
Stack also argues that the answer to the question also has implications for the applicability of 
the Chevron doctrine and the validity of executive orders, issues beyond the scope of this 
paper in view of my conclusion that simple delegations generally communicate no particular 
intent to limit presidential control. See Stack, supra note 4, at 307–14.  
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President’s instructions.9  Two consequences that are potentially 
undesirable from a policy perspective might follow:  first, an agency official 
might perceive that she is less able to resist an incorrect—or worse—
presidential viewpoint, even if she sees it as a poor exercise of discretion.10  
Second, agency accountability for decision making might be reduced if the 
official is able to say, “The President made me do it.”11
Then-professor, now Justice, Elena Kagan argued in 2001 that a 
reasonable interpretive principle is to understand a delegation to an 
executive branch agency as Congress leaving open, rather than foreclosing, 
the possibility of presidential directive authority.
   
12  She made this argument 
in view of the backdrop of removal authority, the history of presidential 
oversight of agency regulatory activity, and other presidential actions.  
Congress, she argued, should be understood as delegating authority against 
the backdrop of presidential control.  She further argued that the “very 
subtlety of the line between directive authority and other tools of 
presidential control,” such as influence, “provides reason to doubt any 
congressional intent to disaggregate them.”13  She suggested that the most 
likely explanation is that Congress has no specific intent on the matter.  She 
conceded, however, that her argument could be defeated if “Congress 
sometimes stipulated that a delegation of power to an agency official was 
subject to the ultimate control of the President.”14
Professor Kevin Stack took up Kagan’s invitation and, in 2006, in a 
thorough and meticulous analysis, presented a variety of such so-called 
mixed delegations.  He reasoned that Congress’s use of delegations only to 
the President, including to act “through” a specified agency, or to agency 
heads subject to explicit presidential approval strongly implied that 
statutory delegations just to executive branch officials—so-called simple 
delegations—were meant to curb the President’s authority.
 
15
In this short symposium contribution, I attempt first to add some further 
evidence on the interpretive question.  That evidence weighs strongly, in 
my view, in favor of Kagan’s conclusion that the terminology does not 
communicate any particular congressional intent regarding presidential 
directive authority.  Assessed in context, the “whole code” textual analysis 
presented by Stack does not justify the conclusion that Congress, by 
 
 
 9. Strauss, supra note 1, at 704. 
 10. See id. at 736; Stack, supra note 4, at 296. 
 11. Sargentich, supra note 3, at 9. 
 12. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2327–28 
(2001).  Stack discusses the extent to which Kagan’s position was anticipated in the 1920s 
by James Hart. See Stack, supra note 4, at 294 (“Hart contended that these delegations do 
not support the inference that the President lacked authority to bind an agency’s discretion 
when the delegation ran only to the agency.” (citing JAMES HART, THE ORDINANCE MAKING 
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 195 n.30 (1925)). 
 13. Id. at 2328. 
 14. Id. at 2329. 
 15. Stack, supra note 4, at 277 (“[I]n view of these express provisions of presidential 
control in delegations to executive officials, delegations to executive officials alone—
‘simple delegations’—should not be read to grant directive authority to the President.”). 
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delegating to an executive branch official, meant to limit presidential 
control.  Independent agencies excluded, interpreting the terms of simple 
and presidential delegations to speak to directive authority fails, in general, 
to make sense of the various statutes.  Absent any special legislative 
context, the most reasonable interpretation of these words is that neither a 
presidential delegation nor a simple delegation to an executive agency 
speaks to presidential directive authority.  Instead, Congress’s intent in 
delegating to the President appears to be simply to convey the additional 
power to choose which executive branch agency official will be primarily 
responsible for carrying out a statutory delegation.16
Moreover, even if simple delegations could be interpreted to limit 
presidential directive authority, it is unclear that the interpretation would 
have the claimed beneficial effect of increasing the resistance of individual 
agency officials to White House pressure.  
 
Policy matters and the legitimacy of White House control weigh heavily 
in Kagan’s arguments as well as in the arguments of Robert Percival, Stack, 
Strauss, and Thomas Sargentich.  I conclude with a few observations on the 
normative debate on presidential control.  I also suggest that we put aside 
the interpretive arguments and focus instead on greater disclosure of the 
content of that control.  Disclosure may be particularly helpful not only in 
helping us resolve the legitimacy of presidential direction, but also in 
informing clearer legislation.   
I.  DO “SIMPLE DELEGATIONS” IMPLY A STATUTORY LIMIT ON 
PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE AUTHORITY? 
At the outset, I put aside delegations to independent agencies, which, 
with their typical limits on presidential removal of agency officials, are 
widely understood as communicating Congress’s intent to minimize 
presidential directive authority. 
In the setting of executive branch agency programs, the best reading of 
the words “President” and “Administrator” is that they reveal no 
generalized congressional intent regarding presidential control.  Instead, the 
use of the term “President” is best understood as a general matter to permit 
the President to assign primary implementation responsibility to an 
executive branch agency of her choice.17
 
 16.  See Kagan, supra note 
  Correspondingly, the use of the 
term “Administrator” or “Secretary” is best understood as limiting the 
President’s authority to assign implementation responsibility to an agency 
other than that named in the statute, rather than addressing the extent of 
directive authority.  First, as Kagan argued, in the domestic policy arena, 
12, at 2329 (the interpretation “enables the President to 
choose who will function as the initial (and, in practice, usually the ultimate) 
decisionmaker”). 
 17.  Id.  As discussed below, the special context of some statutes may suggest that 
Congress occasionally does envision greater direct presidential supervision. See, e.g., infra 
notes 71, 79 and accompanying text (on Computer Security Act of 1987, later amended by 
E-Government Act of 2002). 
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Congress delegates authority to executive branch agencies against a well-
known backdrop of presidential oversight of and involvement in executive 
agency decisions, particularly agency regulatory decisions.18
Prominent in that backdrop, of course, is presidential power to remove 
executive branch officials.  As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Free 
Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board,
  That weighs 
against an interpretation of “Administrator” or “Secretary” as limiting 
presidential directive authority. 
19 the 
Constitution’s notion of “executive power” has long been understood to 
include the traditional power to remove, unless expressly limited by 
statute.20  Since 1981, moreover, the President has publicly and formally 
asserted regulatory review clearance authority with respect to significant 
executive branch agency rules.  Agencies are not to publish significant 
proposed or final rules without the explicit or implicit approval of the 
Office of Management and Budget’s Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs.21  Even prior to 1981, Presidents were known to “jawbone” the 
agencies.22  Finally, it is widely known that executive agency budget 
requests, legislative positions, and testimony before Congress are all 
systematically coordinated and “cleared” through White House offices so 
that a unified executive branch position can be presented.23
Even with a delegation straight to the “Administrator” or the “Secretary,” 
then, Congress is likely to expect potentially substantial presidential 
oversight of a wide range of executive branch agency actions.
 
24  Indeed, the 
scholars arguing against directive authority concede that the statutes should 
be understood to permit substantial presidential influence over executive 
branch agency officials.25
 
 18. Kagan, supra note 
  That influence, of course, can facilitate 
12, at 2328. 
 19. 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). 
 20. Id. at 3151–52 (discussing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117, 164 (1926)). 
 21. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 
127 (1982), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. at 638. 
 22. See generally Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies:  Ex Parte 
Contacts by the White House, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 943 (1980). 
 23. See, e.g., Percival, supra note 4, at 983–84. 
 24. This conclusion would be different if the agency action were a formal adjudication 
or rulemaking subject to ex parte contact restrictions under the Administrative Procedure Act 
or authorizing statute. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (2006); 
Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1545 (9th Cir. 
1993) (prohibition on ex parte contacts applied to President when formal adjudication 
decision vested in other agency officials). 
 25. See Sargentich, supra note 3, at 19 (“The key distinction under the traditional view 
in any event is the one between presidential influence or persuasion on the one hand, and 
presidential command and direction on the other.”); Stack, supra note 4, at 294 (“All of this 
authority means that the President is likely to be able to implement his policy through 
executive branch agencies . . . .”); Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the 
President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 200 (1986); see also 
Proposed Executive Order Entitled “Federal Regulation,” 5 Op. O.L.C. 59, 61 (1981) (“We 
believe that an inquiry into congressional intent in enacting statutes delegating rulemaking 
authority will usually support the legality of presidential supervision of rulemaking by 
executive agencies.”). 
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interagency coordination and broad policy direction by an electorally 
accountable official.  There seems little dispute that a simple statutory 
delegation permits the President to influence—even direct—an agency to 
address one problem over another—to prioritize air pollution control over 
hazardous waste cleanup, say— or to require executive branch agencies not 
to take conflicting approaches with one another.  At the other end of the 
continuum, there seems little dispute that the language of the simple 
delegation ought to be understood to bar the President from, say, signing a 
Federal Register notice in lieu of the agency official or perhaps even from 
having White House officials conduct an entire rulemaking procedure from 
start to finish, having the agency only publish the rule.  That would leave 
the agency with a purely formal role.   
But does a simple delegation convey any congressional intent to limit the 
President from directing an agency official to act or to make a choice 
among available options?  Beyond the backdrop of removal authority and 
presidential involvement in agency decision making, if the choice of the 
word “Administrator” or “Secretary” were meant to convey a limit on 
presidential direction, one also might expect to see some indication in the 
legislative history accompanying statutes making such delegations.  
Although legislative history accompanying delegations to independent 
agencies does sometimes make mention of insulated decision making—or 
at least terms the agencies “independent”—the legislative history of 
statutory delegations to executive branch agency heads does not seem to do 
more than mention that the delegation is to the official in question.  For 
example, the Clean Air Act’s26 delegation to the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) to set national ambient air quality standards was 
accompanied by a comment in the legislative history mentioning only that 
delegation—there is no mention of insulation or independence.27  Similarly, 
the legislative history of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,28 
which delegates authority to the Secretary of Labor, does discuss separation 
of powers concerns and insulation, but only with respect to the advisability 
of combining enforcement and standard-setting in the same agency.29  It 
appears to contain no discussion of whether the Secretary should be 
insulated from presidential oversight, but discusses only whether it is 
appropriate to insulate enforcement within the agency.30
 
 26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2006). 
  This is not to say 
 27. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-1146, at 1 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5356, 5356 
(“The Secretary of [the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare] will be authorized 
and directed to establish nationwide ambient air quality standards.”).  The President is not 
mentioned in the report. 
 28. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 
U.S.C.). 
 29. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 655 (authorizing Secretary to set standards); id. § 657 
(authorizing Secretary to inspect and investigate workplaces for compliance with standards). 
 30. See S. REP. NO. 91-1282, at 8 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 5184–
85 (“Rather than dividing responsibility by creating yet another agency, the committee 
believes that a sounder program will result if responsibility for the formulation of rules is 
assigned to the same administrator who [is] also responsible for their enforcement and for 
 
2011] THE PRESIDENT’S STATUTORY AUTHORITY  2461 
that the apparent absence of legislative history is dispositive,31 but it is 
suggestive.  By contrast, the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
created in the Dodd-Frank legislation,32 headed by an official who is 
removable only for cause, is specifically described as an “independent 
bureau” in its legislative history.33
In short, the backdrop and legislative context of simple delegations, 
compared with independent agency delegations, do not support the 
interpretation that simple delegations, like independent agency delegations, 
are meant to insulate the agency from the exercise of presidential directive 
authority. 
 
Further, if a delegation straight to an executive branch agency official 
were meant generally by Congress to insulate the official from presidential 
direction, a statutory delegation to the President should mean Congress 
intends correspondingly greater presidential supervisory or directive 
authority.  That reading must be rejected.  As a general matter, the term 
“President” generally cannot reasonably be understood to represent any 
greater expectation of presidential involvement than with a simple 
delegation.  Correspondingly, there cannot be an implication that the term 
“Secretary” or “Administrator,” at least within the executive branch, means 
less. 
Consider first the exponential growth in the size of the administrative 
state.34
 
seeing that they are workable and effective in their day-to-day application, thus permitting 
cohesive administration of a total program.  In the committee’s view, the question of 
separation of power is not so much one of whether the Secretary should be separated from 
the power to set standards, but whether he should be separated from the power to administer 
an integral program, and from the power of the Congress and the public to hold him 
accountable for the overall implementation of that program.”). 
  From this alone, one could infer that a reasonable Congress would 
expect the President to make few, if any, decisions personally, undermining 
any inference of expected presidential direction from repeated uses of the 
term “President.” 
 31. Cf. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 406 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing 
the assumption that “dogs will bark when something important is happening”). 
 32. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.). 
 33. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 599–600 (2010) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2010 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 730–31 (describing director as removable only for cause, and the bureau 
as an “independent bureau”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 111-703, at 21 (2011) (describing 
Bureau as “[l]ed by an independent director,” with “[i]ndependent [b]udget” and 
“[i]ndependent [r]ule [w]riting” powers). 
 34. STEPHEN G. BREYER, RICHARD STEWART, CASS SUNSTEIN & MATHEW L. SPITZER, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY:  PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 1 (5th ed. 
2002) (“Much of modern life is a product, in large part, of the activities of administrative 
agencies.  The range of administrative government is remarkably wide . . . .”); 1 RICHARD J. 
PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.3, at 8 (5th ed. 2010) (“The size and scope 
of federal administrative activity has increased during every period in the nation’s history.”); 
Meredith Abernathy, Running on Empty:  Will Exxon Mobil Cause a Breakdown for 
Chevron and the Administrative State?, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 583, 592 (2007) (noting 
“rapid proliferation in both the number and variety of agencies”). 
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Beyond this, Congress explicitly recognized the limits on presidential 
capacity by creating a regime that gives the President complete autonomy to 
choose which decisions she will make when he receives a delegation of 
statutory authority.  In 1951, Congress enacted the Presidential 
Subdelegation Act of 1950,35 partly in response to complaints from 
President Harry S. Truman that the burden of individual approvals and 
other paperwork was occupying “‘3 hours every night.’”36  That Act 
permits the President to redelegate to an executive branch agency official, 
through executive order, any power she has received under statute, leaving 
her the unfettered choice either to reserve formal approval authority or to 
condition that delegation on such “terms, conditions, and limitations as the 
President may deem advisable.”37
Moreover, in actual practice and at least in the domestic policy setting, 
the President nearly always formally and publicly redelegates these 
statutory authorities.  Numerous presidential executive orders and 
memoranda delegate statutory functions to individual executive branch 
officials.
  In short, through the Presidential 
Subdelegation Act, Congress formally repudiated any understanding of the 
term “President” as conveying a requirement—or even an expectation—of 
personal Presidential direction or decision making. 
38  Occasionally these documents are used to revise and reassign 
earlier delegations, though I have yet to locate an outright revocation of 
such a delegation.39
 
 35. Pub. L. No. 81-673, 64 Stat. 419 (codified at 3 U.S.C. §§ 301–303 (2006)). 
  Although executive orders sometimes require agency 
 36. See Verkuil, supra note 22, at 966 (quoting S. REP. NO. 81-1867, at 1 (1950), 
reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2931, 2931); see also Percival, supra note 4, at 1007–08. 
 37. See 3 U.S.C. § 301 (“The President . . . is authorized to designate and empower the 
head of any department or agency in the executive branch . . . to perform without approval, 
ratification, or other action by the President (1) any function which is vested in the President 
by law, or (2) any function which such officer is required or authorized by law to perform 
only with or subject to the approval, ratification, or other action of the President . . . .”).  
Specific authorities to designate—though they are clearly not necessary after the Presidential 
Subdelegation Act—appear in other statutes as well. See, e.g., Farm Security and Rural 
Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, § 3107(d), 116 Stat. 134, 296 (codified with 
some differences in language at 7 U.S.C. § 1736-1). 
 38. For a few of the numerous examples, see, for example, Exec. Order No. 13,419, 3 
C.F.R. 256 (2007) (delegating authorities to Director of the Office of Science and 
Technology Policy, in consultation with NASA and the Departments of Defense and 
Transportation); George W. Bush, Memorandum for the Director of the Office of Personnel 
Management (July 8, 2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 45,155 (July 31, 2003) (codified at 5 C.F.R. pt. 
724 (2009)); George W. Bush, Memorandum for the Secretary of Agriculture (Mar. 11, 
2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 12,569 (Mar. 17, 2003) (delegating authorities to Secretary of 
Agriculture); William J. Clinton, Memorandum for the Administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency (Aug. 19, 1993), 58 Fed. Reg. 52,397 (Oct. 8, 1993); Exec. Order No. 
12,580, 3 C.F.R. 193 (1988) (delegating presidential authority under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) to agencies including 
the EPA, Coast Guard, and the Departments of Interior, Commerce, and Health and Human 
Services (HHS)). 
 39. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,308, 3 C.F.R. 239 (2004); Exec. Order No. 13,286, 3 
C.F.R. 166 (2004). 
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officials receiving a delegation to consult with other agencies,40
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act,
 I also have 
yet to locate a delegation of authority under a domestic statute where the 
President has elected to retain any approval authority over presidential 
authority delegated to an agency. 
41 
for example, delegates a wide range of authorities to the President, 
including the authority not only to declare a disaster but to enter into 
contracts, give warnings, distribute food vouchers, arrange for mass 
feedings, and provide transportation to individuals dislocated by disaster.42  
Presidents have delegated the overwhelming majority of Stafford Act 
authorities among several executive branch agencies,43 retaining only the 
authority to declare the existence of a national disaster.44  The President has 
retained no approval authority over the rest of the decisions delegated to 
agency officials.  And the retention of the disaster-declaring authority 
seems unusual.  In general, presidents do not, for example, personally 
promulgate rules.  (Electronic searching of the Federal Register since 
January 1981 has identified only two issues where rules seem to be signed 
or approved by sitting Presidents:  the procedures for requesting a 
presidential pardon and the tolls charged on the Panama Canal.45
 
 40. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,777, sec. 1, 3 C.F.R. 351, 352–53 (1992) (delegating 
Oil Pollution Act authorities to EPA and the Departments of Interior, Commerce, and 
Transportation, including some delegations based on location of spill); George W. Bush, 
Memorandum for the Secretary of Agriculture (Mar. 11, 2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 12,569 (Mar. 
17, 2003) (requiring Secretary of Agriculture to consult with Food Policy Assistance Council 
and other heads of federal departments and agencies). 
)  In the 
 41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5207. 
 42. See generally id. 
 43. Most delegations are now to the Department of Homeland Security; past delegations 
have named Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA), and the Department of Defense (DOD). See Exec. Order No. 13,286, 3 
C.F.R. 166 (2004); Exec. Order No. 12,673, 3 C.F.R. 214 (1990); Exec. Order No. 12,148, 3 
C.F.R. 412 (1980) (superseded 1994).  Over time, a substantial number of functions 
originally distributed among agencies have become consolidated in FEMA. 
 44. See Exec. Order No. 12,673, 3 C.F.R. 214 (1990). 
 45. In January, 2011, I performed the following Westlaw search in the Federal Register 
database:  ca(“final rule” “rules and regulations”) su(“final rule” “rules and regulations”) 
pr(“rules and regulations” “final rule”) & (((george /3 bush) (william /3 clinton) (barack /3 
obama) (ronald /3 reagan)) w/15 (signed dated approved issued)).  That database covers all 
Federal Register publications beginning in January, 1981.  The search identified 120 relevant 
documents, each of which I personally reviewed.  Of those documents, the President 
executed rules regarding presidential pardon applications. See Department of Justice, Office 
of the Pardon Attorney, Rules Governing Petitions for Executive Clemency, Victim 
Notification and Comment, 65 Fed. Reg. 58,223 (Sept. 28, 2000) (codified as amended at 28 
C.F.R. § 1.6 (2010)) (expressly approved by President Clinton); Department of Justice, 
Office of the Pardon Attorney, Rules Governing Petitions for Executive Clemency, Capital 
Cases, 65 Fed. Reg. 48,379 (Aug. 8, 2000) (codified as amended at 28 C.F.R. § 1.10 (2010)) 
(expressly approved by President Clinton); Department of Justice, Office of the Pardon 
Attorney, Rules Governing Petitions for Executive Clemency, 58 Fed. Reg. 53,658 (Oct. 18, 
1993) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 1 (2010)) (expressly approved by President Clinton).  
Besides the pardon rules, the only others appeared to relate to tolls on the Panama Canal. See 
The President, Panama Canal Commission, Tolls for Use of Canal and Rules for 
Measurement of Vessels, 59 Fed. Reg. 43,254 (Aug. 22, 1994) (signed by President 
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domestic policy setting, the very rare provision that precludes the President 
from delegating a determination to the executive branch agencies confirms 
the congressional expectation that agencies, rather than the President, will 
be primarily responsible for statutory implementation, including the 
issuance of rules, even when the statute says “President.”46
In short, the Presidential Subdelegation Act, as well as the sheer size of 
the administrative state, the practice of presidential delegation of statutory 
authorities without reservation into the agencies, and the rarity of direct 
presidential rulemaking, all tend to negate any conclusion that Congress’s 
use of the term “President” generally means that the President is obligated, 
or even expected, to formally act or decide under the statute.  The 
Presidential Subdelegation Act communicates Congress’s understanding 
that, notwithstanding its use of the word “President” in authorizing statutes, 
agencies could properly implement the statutes with no presidential 
involvement whatsoever.  Instead, it is simply the President’s choice how 
much to supervise, direct, or approve. 
 
Given this pattern of statutory enactments, as well as of legislative 
context, delegation to the “President” in the domestic setting would be 
better understood not as communicating an intent regarding presidential 
supervision or direction, but instead as a first step to the powers ultimately 
arriving in an executive agency, the head of which is, of course, removable 
at the President’s will.  That agency would simply be selected by the 
President rather than by Congress.  As Kagan argued, a delegation straight 
to an executive branch agency, then, simply amounts to a limitation on the 
President’s ability to assign the task elsewhere.47
This understanding of congressional intent also avoids a significant 
difficulty regarding the application of the Administrative Procedures Act 
(APA).  If the use of the term “President” were meant to convey a 
 
 
Clinton); The President, Panama Canal Commission, Tolls for Use of Canal, 57 Fed. Reg. 
37,066 (Aug. 17, 1992) (signed by President George H.W. Bush); The President, Panama 
Canal Commission, Tolls for Use of Canal and Rules for Measurement of Vessels, 54 Fed. 
Reg. 35,148 (Aug. 23, 1989) (signed by President George H.W. Bush).   
I also used the following search in the Federal Register database to identify rules whose 
source might be the Executive Office of the President:  ca(“final rule” “rules and 
regulations”) su(“final rule” “rules and regulations”) pr(“rules and regulations” “final rule”) 
/10 “executive office.”  The search identified a few rules executed either by officials of 
agencies within the Executive Office of the President (EOP):  the Council on Environmental 
Quality, the Office of Management Budget, or the U.S. Trade Representative.  The search 
uncovered two rules issued directly by the EOP:  one on standards of conduct for employees 
of the executive office of the President, see Executive Office of the President, Repeal of 
Standards of Conduct for Employees of the Executive Office of the President, 64 Fed. Reg. 
12,881 (Mar. 16, 1999) (codified at 3 C.F.R. pt. 100 (2010)), and one on equal employment 
opportunity, see Enforcement of Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Federally 
Conducted Programs, 53 Fed. Reg. 25,872 (July 8, 1988) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of C.F.R.).  Neither was executed by the President. 
 46. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7410(f) (permitting President to suspend certain air quality 
regulations in the event of a national or regional emergency and providing that “[s]uch 
determination shall not be delegable by the President to any other person”). 
 47.  See Kagan, supra note 12, at 2329. 
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congressional expectation that the President would exercise directive or 
decisional authority, it might raise concerns that a large number of such 
decisions also should be understood as insulated from APA review under 
the doctrine of Franklin v. Massachusetts.48  In Franklin, the Supreme 
Court held that the President was not an agency within the meaning of the 
APA and that presidential decisions were thus immune from statutory 
review under the APA.49  Instead, we can infer that—consistent with 
maintaining the widespread availability of APA review—Congress’s 
expectation and intent generally is that agencies, subject to the APA, will 
exercise all these powers, whether the delegation is simple or to the 
President.50
It might also be argued, however, that even if Congress contemplated 
that, generally, the President would not personally implement or direct the 
particular statutory authorities, the reference to the “President” could still 
indicate an authorization, if not an expectation, for behind-the-scenes 
direction of an agency’s decision.  By delegating straight to an agency 
official, then, we could understand Congress as refusing the President such 
directive authority. 
 
Since “President” cannot fairly be read as a generalized congressional 
expectation of greater presidential control, its omission in a simple 
delegation is weak support for reading that language as congressional intent 
to limit presidential control.  In addition, such an interpretation does not 
make sense of some well-known statutory delegations.  Those delegations 
are not consistent with understanding the term “President” to authorize 
greater presidential direction and the term “Administrator” or “Secretary” to 
limit that power.51
Consider first the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act
 
52
 
 48. 505 U.S. 788 (1992). 
 (CERCLA, or Superfund).  That statute 
delegates most decisions to the President.  Delegations under CERCLA to 
 49. Id. at 800–01 (President not an “agency” for APA purposes).  Stack has discussed 
possible nonstatutory forms of review of the President’s exercise of statutory authorities, 
even in the absence of APA review. See Kevin M. Stack, The Reviewability of the 
President’s Statutory Powers, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1169, 1194 (2009) (“Franklin [v. 
Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992)] did not eliminate review of the President’s compliance 
with statute outside the APA.”). 
 50. See Kagan, supra note 12, at 2351 (discussing Franklin) (“When the challenge is to 
an action delegated to an agency head but directed by the President . .  . the review 
provisions usually applicable to that agency’s action should govern.”).  Particular statutory 
contexts might suggest that Congress specifically intended the President to be personally 
involved, and some of those contexts are discussed below.  The point here, however, is that a 
text’s reference to the “President” alone would not convey an intent to insulate the decision 
from APA review. See also Strauss, supra note 1, at 713 (citing EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE 
PRESIDENT:  OFFICE AND POWERS 1787–1957, at 80 (4th rev. ed. 1957)) (discussing Corwin’s 
analysis of the APA issue). 
 51. The exception here would be that in a delegation to the “President,” the President 
would have power to revoke or reassign the delegation; I have yet to locate an outright 
revocation, though Presidents do sometimes reassign delegations to other agencies. 
 52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006). 
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the President include the authority to devise the so-called National 
Contingency Plan—a plan for responding to releases of hazardous 
substances into the environment.53  Presidential delegations also include the 
power to investigate and to undertake response actions to address hazardous 
waste contamination at individual sites.54
Nor would it be reasonable to draw any inference that Congress 
specifically intended greater presidential supervision over individual site 
cleanup decisions compared with certain other decisions allocated to 
agencies.  Take first the Clean Air Act.  That statute delegates most powers 
directly to the Administrator of the EPA, including the setting of national 
ambient air quality standards and numerous air emissions limitations.
  Congress’s expectation in 
delegating to the President in CERCLA could not possibly have been that 
the President would be supervising individual site cleanup decisions—or 
responding to individual cases of hazardous waste contamination—at the 
thousands of contaminated sites across the country.  Such decision making 
would simply be infeasible.  Indeed, in the executive orders delegating 
CERCLA authorities, the President has reserved no express approval or 
review authority over any CERCLA decisions, outside whatever influence 
might be exercised through the regulatory review process for setting overall 
cleanup standards. 
55  
That Act was most recently extensively revised in 1990, well after the 
formalization and institutionalization of regulatory review.56  The EPA has 
set and revised national ambient air quality standards for only six criteria air 
pollutants, and compliance with these standards, if set with any degree of 
stringency, can be extremely costly.  These are the sort of infrequent and 
high impact decisions a President could feasibly monitor.    Under the 
current regulatory review executive order, a national ambient air quality 
standard would clearly qualify as an “economically significant rule” subject 
to Office of Management and Budget/Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OMB/OIRA) review, and White House influence in such decisions 
has been reported prominently.57
 
 53. Id. § 9605(a) (“[T]he President shall, after notice and opportunity for public 
comments, revise and republish the national contingency plan for the removal of oil and 
hazardous substances . . . .”). 
  Even if Congress did not desire 
presidential supervision of air quality standard setting, it is not reasonable 
to infer that Congress must have intended greater presidential  direction of 
 54. See, e.g., id. § 9604(a)(1) (“[T]he president is authorized to act, consistent with the 
national contingency plan, to remove or arrange for the removal of, and provide for remedial 
action relating to such hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant at any time . . . .”). 
 55. See, e.g., id. § 7408 (delegation to Administrator to set national ambient air quality 
standards); id. § 7521 (delegation to Administrator to set new car emissions standards). 
 56. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 219, 104 Stat. 
2399, 2492–2500 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7545). 
 57. E.g., John H. Cushman, Jr., Top E.P.A. Official Not Backing Down on Air Standards, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1997, at A1 (describing White House review of national ambient air 
quality for ozone and fine chemical particles); Editorial, Decision Time on Clean Air, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 5, 1997, at A26 (describing regulatory process as EPA “propos[ing] to the 
White House” standards for air pollution). 
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individual site cleanup decisions compared with the issuance of national 
ambient air quality standards. 
Go one step further.  The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 
1976 (RCRA)58 also addresses individual site contamination cleanup 
decisions, those made at existing hazardous waste disposal facilities.  These 
cleanups can closely resemble CERCLA cleanups.  Yet the statute delegates 
control over these cleanup decisions not to the President, as with CERCLA, 
but to the EPA Administrator.59  Under both RCRA and CERCLA, literally 
thousands of contaminated sites are involved.60  Differences in expected 
presidential involvement could not possibly explain why Congress would 
delegate authority over cleanups to the “President” in numerous sections of 
CERCLA while delegating similar authority to the Administrator in 
RCRA.61
And one further example:  the Stafford Act delegates most authorities to 
the President, including the authority to distribute food vouchers, arrange 
for mass feedings, and provide transportation to individuals dislocated by 
disaster.
 
62  Compare that to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program, which delegates the authority to “formulate and administer” a 
food stamp program to the Secretary of Agriculture, so that “eligible 
households . . . shall be provided an opportunity to obtain a more nutritious 
diet.”63
 
 58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6987. 
  It is hard to articulate a plausible reason why Congress would want 
more direct presidential supervision of the distribution of food vouchers in 
the disaster setting and less over the program to distribute assistance under 
the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program.  In short, in the domestic 
policy setting, understanding “Administrator” or “Secretary” as more 
insulating from presidential direction compared with delegations to the 
 59. See, e.g., id. § 6924(u) (providing that Administrator shall require “corrective action 
for all releases of hazardous waste” from permitted treatment, storage, or disposal facility, 
“regardless of the time at which waste was placed in such unit”). 
 60. See, e.g., U.S. EPA, RCRA ORIENTATION MANUAL, at III-123 (2008), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/osw/inforesources/pubs/orientat/rom.pdf (“Approximately 3,800 sites 
are undergoing corrective action, three times the number of sites found on the Superfund 
National Priorities List . . . .”); id. at VI-9 to -14 (chapter section entitled “CERCLA:  The 
Hazardous Waste Cleanup Program”); U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Superfund, 
Basic Information, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/about.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2011) 
(“Over the past 20+ years, we’ve located and analyzed tens of thousands of hazardous waste 
sites, protected people and the environment from contamination at the worst sites, and 
involved others in cleanup.”). 
 61. Most CERCLA authorities have been delegated to the EPA Administrator; no 
presidential approval has been reserved. See Exec. Order No. 12,580, 3 C.F.R. 193 (1988). 
 62. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5179–5180 (regarding food); id. § 5186 (regarding transportation). 
 63. 7 U.S.C. § 2013. Compare id. (authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to administer 
a supplemental nutrition assistance program), and id. § 2014 (authorizing Secretary to set 
eligibility requirements for food stamps), with 42 U.S.C. § 5180 (authorizing President to 
ensure that “adequate stocks of food will be ready and conveniently available”), and id. 
§ 5179 (authorizing President to act “through the Secretary of Agriculture or other 
appropriate agencies” to distribute food coupons through existing programs and to make 
surplus commodities available). 
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“President,” simply does not make sense of delegations currently on the 
books. 
What makes far more sense is the interpretation that a delegation to the 
President does not communicate a particular intent regarding presidential 
direction of agency authority, but instead generally signifies simply that the 
President can select the executive branch official who receives the statutory 
delegation.64
Thus, a delegation to the Administrator under the Clean Air Act (to set 
national ambient air quality standards) or under RCRA (to decide what a 
hazardous waste disposal facility owner must do to address site 
contamination) is not meaningless relative to the President; it precludes the 
President from assigning that authority to, say, the Secretary of Agriculture 
or the Secretary of Commerce.  Nor can the President assign authority over 
the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program to the Secretary of Energy 
or of Commerce. 
  That is consistent with the workings of our administrative 
state, in which the President is widely known on occasion to exercise 
substantial control over executive branch agencies but cannot reasonably be 
expected to systematically make a particular individual decision himself. 
This interpretation also makes sense of the varied presidential delegations 
described above.  The presidential delegations are all examples in which 
more than one agency might have relevant institutional expertise or 
programmatic authority to run a program.  A better reading of the 
delegations is that Congress intended to enlist presidential expertise 
regarding the work of particular executive branch agencies.  CERCLA, for 
example, covers both offshore and onshore contamination, federal facilities, 
as well as the restoration of injured natural resources.65  Multiple federal 
agencies may have relevant programmatic expertise, ranging from the EPA 
(cleanup standards and inland cleanups), the Coast Guard (offshore 
contamination), and the Commerce Department (coastal resources), to the 
Departments of Agriculture (national forests), Interior (national parks and 
wildlife), and Defense and Energy (federal facilities).  Presidents have 
delegated CERCLA authorities sometimes to a single agency and 
sometimes jointly to multiple agencies, depending on the particular 
provision.66  In addition, the Oil Pollution Act of 199067
 
 64. Kagan, supra note 
 delegates most 
authorities to the President.  Spills could take place inland, on coastal areas, 
12, at 2329. 
 65. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(8) (defining “environment” to include “navigable waters, . . . 
ocean waters, . . . any other surface water . . . land surface, or ambient air within the United 
States or under the jurisdiction of the United States”); id. § 9601(16) (defining “natural 
resources” to include “land, fish, wildlife, biota, air water, ground water, drinking water 
supplies, and other such resources, belonging to, managed by, held in trust by . . . the United 
States . . . , any State or local government, any foreign government, [or] any Indian 
tribe . . . .”); id. § 9620(a)(1) (applying statute to “[e]ach department, agency, and 
instrumentality of the United States”); id. § 9620(a)(2) (applying statute to “facilities which 
are owned or operated by a department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States”). 
 66. See Exec. Order No. 12,580, 3 C.F.R. 193 (1988). 
 67. Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
U.S.C.). 
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or in deep water.  In each location, a different agency might offer both 
expertise and the advantages of efficiency, given its other institutional 
responsibilities.  By executive order, the President has delegated lead 
response authority for oil spills on the coastline to the Coast Guard.  
Meanwhile, the President has designated the EPA as the lead agency for 
spills in the inland zone.  Both are required to consult with a variety of 
other agencies and with state and local government.  Different federal 
agencies (including the Departments of Defense, Interior, and Agriculture) 
are designated as natural resource trustees for purposes of assessing and 
restoring injury to natural resources.68
By contrast, delegation to a particular executive branch agency official 
may simply signify Congress’s awareness of agency expertise and 
experience and its intent that a new program be coordinated with and 
benefit from the expertise a particular agency has already developed in 
running related programs.  The RCRA
  Finally, the Stafford Act involves 
providing housing, transportation, and food to disaster victims, a range of 
issues implicating the expertise of multiple agencies.   
69 statute, for example, mainly 
regulates land-based hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal 
facilities; accordingly, it makes sense that Congress would delegate most 
responsibilities to the EPA, since some of that agency’s other programs  
also cover inland polluting activity.70
Outside of statutes with implications for defense or foreign relations or 
other statutes with an unusual context,
 
71
 
 68. See Exec. Order No. 12,777, § 1, 3 C.F.R. 351, 352–53 (1992). 
 it thus makes most sense to 
 69. See supra notes 58–59. 
 70. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921–6939f (setting out hazardous waste management regime, 
including regulation of treatment, storage, and disposal). 
 71. For example, section 4 of the Computer Security Act of 1987, later incorporated into 
the E-Government Act of 2002, called for specific, nondelegable presidential review of 
Department of Commerce standards for computer security. See Computer Security Act of 
1987, Pub. L. No. 100-235, § 4, 100 Stat. 1724, 1726 (1988), amended by the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 5101, 110 Stat. 186, 
later incorporated into the E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 302(a), 116 
Stat. 2899, 2956 (ultimately codified as amended at 40 U.S.C. § 11331); E-Government Act 
of 2002 § 302(a), 116 Stat. at 2956 (“The President’s authority to disapprove or modify such 
standards and guidelines may not be delegated.”).  The Computer Security Act of 1987 
represented a strong reaction to the 1985 and 1986 issuance of directives placing control of 
information security in the DOD, including both classified and sensitive but unclassified 
information.  As described in a hearing prior to the legislation, these directives expanded 
“DOD’s control [over] a wide spectrum of scientific, economic and cultural information in 
our [n]ation.” See Computer Security Act of 1987:  Hearings on H.R. 145 Before a 
Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 100th Cong. 382 (1987) (statement of Rep. 
Jack Brooks).  Because of congressional concern over the “‘Big Brother’ activities of DOD 
and NSA,” the bill placed control of information security in a civilian agency, the 
Department of Commerce, but with specific presidential oversight in view of the national 
security implications. H.R. REP. NO. 100-153, pt. 2, at 7 (1987), reprinted in 1987 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3157, 3159.  As the Report explained, “The bill also establishes a presidential 
review process whereby the Secretary of Commerce can be directed to modify or rescind a 
standard when the President determines it is in the public interest to do so.” Id. at 10, 1987 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3162.  The statute was ultimately modified to eliminate the presidential 
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understand all these delegations—whether to the President, the Secretary, or 
the Administrator—simply as delegations into the executive branch, headed 
as it is by a Chief Executive with the power to remove agency heads at will.  
A delegation to the President generally communicates no distinct intent 
regarding presidential direction or control, but means simply that the 
President can select the agency.  With respect to presidential directive 
authority, Congress’s general intent in delegating to the Administrator or 
the Secretary, as opposed to the President, may best be reflected, in Kagan’s 
words, in an “interpretive principle presuming an undifferentiated 
presidential control of executive agency officials.”72
For a recent example that clearly shows the meaning (or absence of 
meaning) of a presidential delegation in the setting of domestic legislation, 
consider the 2009 federal climate change legislative proposals.
   
73  The so-
called Waxman-Markey legislation had passed the House and the Senate 
was considering climate change bills.  Agriculture groups wanted the 
Department of Agriculture to run part of a proposed climate change 
program defining which greenhouse-gas-reducing agricultural projects 
would qualify to create saleable “offsets” for greenhouse gas emissions 
generated elsewhere.  The Waxman-Markey bill assigned (and 
environmentalists preferred) responsibility for defining such offsets to the 
EPA.74  In the Senate bill, compromise was reached on the issue by 
delegating authority to the President to, post-enactment, select the relevant 
agency.  None of the word choices—“Secretary,” “Administrator,” or 
“President”—appeared to relate to presidential supervision, direction, or the 
lack thereof.  The Senate bill used presidential delegation simply to dodge, 
through delegation, the question of which executive branch agency would 
have primary responsibility for developing offset rules.75
Are there more arguments from statutory text that ought to be 
considered?  In 2001, Kagan suggested that one counterargument to her 
position would be if Congress “sometimes stipulated that a delegation . . . to 
an agency official was subject to the ultimate control of the President.”
 
76
 
review process. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 1002(a), 116 
Stat. 2135, 2268 (rewriting 40 U.S.C. § 11331). 
  
The existence of such language might suggest more strongly, on an 
expressio unius theory, that the failure to mention either the President or 
presidential approval in another statute delegating authority to an agency 
official should be understood as Congress’s intent to insulate the official 
from presidential directive authority.  Stack responded to Kagan with a 
 72. Kagan, supra note 12, at 2328. 
 73. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. 
 74. Id. § 732(a) (authorizing EPA Administrator to “promulgate regulations establishing 
a program for the issuance of offset credits”). 
 75. See Alison Winter, Kerry-Boxer Proposal Leaves Question Mark for Forestry 
Groups, ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, Oct. 2, 2009, http://www.eenews.net/
public/EEDaily/2009/10/02/2 (“The new Senate text gives the [P]resident jurisdiction over 
the potential program, rather than defining clear roles for USDA and U.S. EPA.”). 
 76. Kagan, supra note 12, at 2329. 
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collection of mixed delegations from the U.S. Code, arguing that their 
existence signifies that congressional delegation only to an executive 
agency official in other statutes, without mention of the President, must be 
understood to preclude presidential directive authority. 
Despite Kagan’s statement in 2001, it is not clear how strong an 
inference the difference in wording could yield, even if such mixed 
delegations were commonplace.  The argument assumes that Congress’s 
specifications of decisional procedures (such as presidential approvals) are 
sufficiently particular that negative implications can be drawn from their 
omission. 
Congress, however, has expressly rejected any implication that a mixed 
delegation is distinct from either a delegation to the agency or a delegation 
directly to the President.  Again, consider the Presidential Subdelegation 
Act.  The Act permits the President to treat as identical a delegation of 
authority to the President by law and a mixed delegation of authority to an 
agency official subject to presidential approval.  The President is equally 
empowered to delegate either function solely to an agency head “without 
approval, ratification, or other action by the President.”77  In other words, a 
President can readily convert either a presidential delegation or a mixed 
delegation into a simple delegation, reserving no formal approval authority 
whatsoever.  Confirming this understanding, once in a great while Congress 
requires presidential approval and expressly refuses presidential authority to 
redelegate that approval.78
Even if the language of a mixed delegation could be read to imply 
reduced presidential involvement when a statute delegating to an executive 
agency official contains no reference to the “President,” the mixed 
delegations Stack collects are not sufficient to support the inference he 
wishes to draw from the simple delegation.  Nearly all the statutes he cites 
as examples of mixed delegations fall in one of three categories that makes 
 
 
 77. See 3 U.S.C. § 301 (2006) (“The President of the United States is authorized to 
designate . . . [an agency official] to perform without approval, ratification, or other action 
by the President (1) any function which is vested in the President by law, or (2) any function 
which such officer is required or authorized by law to perform only with or subject to the 
approval, ratification, or other action of the President . . . .”). 
 78. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 8374(e) (restricting delegation of Presidential authority to issue 
emergency orders relating to energy supply); E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
347, § 302(a), 116 Stat. 2899, 2956 (“The President’s authority to disapprove or modify such 
[information security] standards and guidelines may not be delegated.”) (current version, 
without presidential disapproval, at 40 U.S.C. § 11331).  Electronic searching in the U.S. 
Code (“president /p ‘may not be delegated’”) revealed only fourteen such delegations.  
Moreover, as Stack himself acknowledges, Congress occasionally delegates a decision to an 
agency official “in the judgment” of the official, possibly implying the reservation of a 
greater amount of control to the agency official than in the case of the simple delegation. See 
Stack, supra note 4, at 288 n.116.  Stack may be correct that these delegations and simple 
delegations are cognate ways of granting authority to the agency official, although one other 
implication is that a delegation to the agency official without “judgment” is meant to include 
greater space for presidential judgment.  I would continue to read both of them against the 
backdrop of presidential supervision.  These delegations also might signal that, on review, a 
court should be relatively deferential to the agency’s final judgment on the matter. 
2472 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
them less relevant:  pre-1950, national security, or foreign relations.  At 
least twenty-seven of the statutes Stack cites that mention both the President 
and an agency deal either with national security issues or with foreign 
relations issues.79  Both defense and foreign relations statutes potentially 
represent special cases, in view of Article II’s text describing the 
President’s powers not only as chief executive, but as “Commander in 
Chief,” and her authority, subject to Senate ratification, to “make 
treaties.”80  The statutes Stack discusses, for example, include one law 
granting the power to “terminate any air service agreement between the 
United States and a country” where a determination of dangerousness is 
made,81 and the authority to suspend operations of air carriers to and from a 
foreign country where the country is acting inconsistently with an 
international convention on unlawful aircraft.82
With respect to domestic policy, many of the mixed delegation statutes 
Stack cites and discusses are pre-1900, prior to the creation of the modern 
supersized administrative state and well prior to the Presidential 
Subdelegation Act.  Fourteen of the mixed delegation statutes outside the 
national security or defense setting he cites are pre-1900.
  The potential of such a 
suspension to disrupt foreign relations is obvious.  Moreover, the 
Presidential Subdelegation Act continues to apply, authorizing the President 
to fully delegate her approval authority in these mixed delegations without 
restriction.  Beyond this, these particular mixed delegations might be 
viewed as unique in their expectation of presidential involvement, owing 
both to the foreign relations or defense context for the particular decision 
and the decisions’ relative infrequency.  Thus, if the President did not elect 
to redelegate the authority, it would be more reasonable to understand 
Congress’s view of presidential supervision in the particular context as both 
more realistic and more valuable.  No across-the-board inference about the 
meaning of the simple delegation can fairly be drawn from these distinctive 
mixed delegations. 
83
 
 79. These statutes are cited in Stack, supra note 
  (Eight statutes 
4, at 278–85, nn.67–69, 74, 78–79, 84–
85, 87, 89–90, 92–98, 107.  Two additional statutes that arguably fall in this category are 
cited in id. at 281 n.85, 283 n.101. See also id. at 281 n.90 (citing E-Government Act of 
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 302(a), 116 Stat. 2899, 2956 (current, amended version at 40 
U.S.C. § 11331(d)) (“To ensure fiscal and policy consistency, the Secretary shall exercise 
the authority conferred by this section subject to direction by the President and in 
coordination with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.”)).  As explained in 
note 71, the mixed delegation language in the E-Government Act dated from an earlier 
statute, the Computer Security Act of 1987, that was specifically passed in response to DOD 
assertions of control over federal government and contractor computer systems.  It was part 
of moving primary responsibility for computer security to a civilian agency, but subject to 
express presidential oversight in view of national security issues.  The presidential role in the 
delegation has since been deleted.   
 80. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 1–2. 
 81. 22 U.S.C. § 5605(b)(2)(F)(ii)(I). 
 82. See Stack, supra note 4, at 287 nn.109–12 and accompanying text (citing 49 U.S.C. 
§§ 40106, 41302(b), 41304(b), 41302, 44907(d)(1)(D), 44907(e)). 
 83. See Stack, supra note 4, at 279–81 nn.72–80, 84 (citing older domestic mixed 
delegation statutes). 
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are both pre-1900 and relate to national security or defense issues.84)  Three 
more mixed delegations outside the national security or defense setting are 
pre-1950, before Congress enacted the Presidential Subdelegation Act.85
Of the multitude of statutes Stack discusses, twelve both are post-1950 
and concern domestic policy issues.
  
And as noted above, the Presidential Subdelegation Act now effectively 
revises these statutes by permitting the President to convert freely a 
presidential delegation or a mixed delegation into the equivalent of a simple 
statutory delegation. 
86  Ten of the twelve require that the 
action involve more than one executive branch agency, either through joint 
rulemaking or through consultation.87  This characteristic again suggests 
that the mention of the President is not meant to indicate greater 
presidential direction, but instead is an express command of coordination 
among multiple executive branch agencies.  Of the two remaining statutes, 
the history and context of one, the E-Government Act of 2002, turns out to 
implicate national security concerns.88  In the last one, the Full 
Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978,89
 
 84. These statutes are cited in Stack, supra note 
 the President is to act 
“through the Secretary of Labor” to encourage full employment, but the 
statute then sets forth criteria which the Secretary is to apply in “meeting 
the responsibilities” under that section, undermining any inference that the 
4, at 278–81 nn.67–69, 74, 78–79, 84. 
 85. See Agricultural Adjustment Act, ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31, 37 (1933) (codified as amended 
at 7 U.S.C. § 610(c)) (authorizing Secretary of Agriculture, with “approval of the President,” 
to make regulations to carry out its provision); Stack, supra note 4, at 281 n.83 (citing Act of 
Aug. 11, 1939, ch. 717, § 2, 16 U.S.C. § 590z); id. at 286 n.107 (citing Act of June 6, 1942, 
ch. 380, 16 U.S.C. § 459r (authorizing Secretary of Interior “with the approval of the 
President” to convey or lease “recreational demonstration projects”)); see also 16 U.S.C. 
§ 704 (first enacted 1918) (requiring presidential approval of Interior rules permitting 
migratory bird hunting notwithstanding treaty). 
 86. These are cited in Stack, supra note 4, at 281–86 nn.85–86, 90, 91, 94, 99–101, 108. 
 87. See Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1701(6) 
(coordination through multiple executive agency officials); 22 U.S.C. § 7104(b) (President to 
establish programs “through” Secretaries of Labor, HHS, and State, and the Attorney 
General); Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003 § 6, 22 U.S.C. 
§ 7109a (providing for President to act through multiple agencies); 31 U.S.C. § 5341(a)(1) 
(President to act “through” Treasury Secretary and Attorney General in developing strategy 
to combat money laundering); 33 U.S.C. § 2706(e)(1) (coordination with Commerce, Fish 
and Wildlife Service, and EPA on damage assessment regulations); 40 U.S.C. § 17302(a) 
(providing for joint Treasury and Postal Service rulemaking); 49 U.S.C. § 44302(d) 
(providing for interagency consultation as condition of presidential approval of agency 
decision to insure air carriers); Act of Sept. 8, 1982, Pub L. No. 97-254, 96 Stat. 808 
(coordination between Commerce and other designated officials on 1984 Louisiana World 
Expo); Act of Dec. 29, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-169, 93 Stat. 1281 (coordination between 
Commerce and other designated officials on 1982 International Energy Expo); see also 33 
U.S.C. § 2706(e)(1) (authorizing the President “through” the Under Secretary of Commerce 
for Oceans and Atmosphere to promulgate regulations for natural resource damage 
assessment following oil discharge, in consultation with EPA and other agencies); supra 
note 26–33 and accompanying text (citing delegations). 
 88. See supra notes 71, 78. 
 89. Pub. L. No. 95-523, 92 Stat. 1887 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
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statute mentions the President particularly to ensure presidential direction or 
the Secretary particularly to limit it.90
In sum, the mixed delegations Stack cites do not seem to rebut the 
interpretation offered above.  Absent some special context, a statutory 
delegation to the “President” or to an executive agency does not seem to 
represent a particular Congressional intent regarding the extent of 
presidential direction or even supervision of agency action.  By contrast, a 
delegation to the President clearly is meant to authorize the President to 
allocate the primary implementation responsibility, while a simple 
delegation restricts that authority to allocate.  In short, text alone is not 
sufficient to resolve the statutory permissibility of presidential directive 
authority.
 
91
II.  THE STAKES OF THE INTERPRETIVE DEBATE 
 
The scholars who argue that a simple delegation implies some limit on 
presidential control of an agency decision also argue that such an 
interpretation is important because it can facilitate a useful agency 
resistance to presidential control.  As I briefly discuss below, however, the 
very subtlety of the difference between “presidential supervision” and 
“presidential direction” undermines the extent to which a simple delegation 
might supply an agency head with greater resolve.  
 What the terms of the interpretive debate do underscore is a high level of 
concern, particularly among these commentators, regarding presidential 
supervision of agency action.  I agree that presidential direction of agency 
decision making can be potentially problematic. 
In my view, however, the debate over statutory text is not helpful in 
resolving precisely how much presidential control or direction of agency 
activity is permissible.  Instead, we should seek greater transparency to help 
us uncover and evaluate whether presidential supervision and direction 
enhances or detracts from the legitimacy of agency action.92
 
 90. Id. § 206; 15 U.S.C. § 3116.  A possible explanation for the statute’s reference to the 
“President” is for consistency with other sections of the statute referencing the President. 
  And an 
improved understanding of the extent of presidential supervision and its 
effects on agency action could inform legislation that actually does speak 
specifically to presidential supervision. 
 91. Kagan argues at this point that resort must be had to general interpretive principles to 
resolve the question left open by the text.  See Kagan, supra note 11 at 2331 (“the statutory 
question (whether the President, in exercising directive authority, is acting in accordance 
with a standard delegation) . . . itself turns on a policy question (whether the action promotes 
good administrative lawmaking)”)  That position is beyond the scope of this article, in view 
of my discussion in Section II. 
 92. I have argued elsewhere that greater transparency is necessary for presidential 
control to serve any legitimating function for the administrative state. See Nina Mendelson, 
Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1159 
(2010) (“The lack of adequate transparency [undermines both] the appropriateness of 
presidential influence and . . . the legitimacy of agency decision making.”). 
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A.  Backbone 
Stack and Strauss make the particular argument that understanding a 
simple delegation to deprive the President of directive authority could make 
a difference to the attitude of agency officials.  Such officials, they argue, 
will have more fortitude with which to confront the erring President or his 
staff if the authorizing statute can be read to give them, rather than the 
President, the right to make the final call on the issue at hand.93  They 
further assert that, given this understanding of the statute, a poorly 
performing agency official would not be able to avoid accountability by 
blaming the President.94
With respect to agency accountability, however, agency officials rarely, 
if ever, publicly point a blaming finger at the President.  Agency statements 
in support of a rule, for example, do not generally mention the President, 
presidential preferences, or even the content of OMB/OIRA reviews.
 
95  If 
anything, the problem is the reverse, with the President attempting to 
maintain deniability for unpopular agency decisions.96
What about the argument that a simple delegation can supply an agency 
official with greater resoluteness?  The empirical basis for this claim is very 
far from clear.  Even if a simple delegation to an agency official were 
intended to insulate the agency official from presidential directive authority 
and merely make the President the “overseer,” it would seem to make little 
practical difference.  As a formal matter, as all concede, the President 
would still possess the power to remove.  Moreover, the permissibility of 
presidential oversight and supervision of executive branch agency decisions 
is also widely conceded, including the President’s ability to influence an 
agency to prioritize one policy over another, to communicate strong policy 
preferences, or to require that one agency meet the concerns of another in 
reaching a decision.  Even if a simple delegation were read to preclude 
presidential directive authority, then, the President would continue to have 
the power to coordinate, influence, or even cajole.
 
97
For the statutory language to prompt greater resistance, then, the agency 
official responding to presidential pressure first would have to draw a line 
between influence (permissible) and direction (impermissible), and the 
 
 
 93. See Stack, supra note 4, at 295.  Sargentich argues that backbone will be most useful 
in discussions not with the President, but with White House staff. Sargentich, supra note 3, 
at 9; see Percival, supra note 4, at 1005 (“[T]he agency head will be bargaining with greater 
moral authority than she would have if she knew the president had a right to dictate the 
decision.”). 
 94. Cf. Strauss, supra note 1, at 712 (“[D]oes she take it as a command that she has a 
legal as well as a political obligation to honor, and for whose justifications she thus has no 
particular responsibility?” (emphasis added)). 
 95. See Mendelson, supra note 92, at 1146–59. 
 96. See id. at 1161–63; infra note 124–28 and accompanying text. 
 97. E.g., Percival, supra note 4, at 971 (simple delegation argument “does not mean that 
the president is prohibited from communicating with the agency head concerning his 
preferences for how the decision should be made”); Stack, supra note 3, at 294 (“[I]t will be 
difficult for a court to police the line between presidential influence, on the one hand, and 
presidential direction of agency action, on the other.”). 
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statute’s interpretation would presumably only make a difference to the 
agency official in the latter case.  The line between those two situations is 
bound to be difficult to draw.98  Consider the executive agency official 
selected by the President, subject to at-will removal by the President, whose 
agency rule is in the middle of the regulatory review process.  The official 
hears the following statement from a White House official involved in 
regulatory review:  “The President would really, really strongly prefer that 
you select Option A.”  Is this permissible influence or impermissible 
direction?  A more difficult example:  “The Agriculture Department’s view 
is that your preferred choice would cause tremendous difficulties with a 
program they already administer.  We must ask you to choose Option B to 
avoid this conflict with Agriculture.”  In this latter case, Percival has argued 
that the case for having the President resolve the conflict is “considerably 
stronger because the White House is uniquely situated to resolve conflicts 
between agencies.”99
Moreover, whatever the interpretation of the simple delegation, the 
agency official also, as a practical matter, retains the same leverage.  The 
decision still must comply with substantive statutory criteria and 
procedures, whether or not there is White House involvement.  That 
constrains the President’s influence just as it constrains the agency’s 
discretion.
  Perhaps this is in part an argument why an agency 
official, in the exercise of his or her decision-making authority, ought to 
pay particular attention to the White House’s view.  But it is not clear why 
this scenario represents any less displacement of the purported statutory 
delegation.  And if Agriculture’s concerns, say, ought to be treated as 
relevant by the decision-making agency, perhaps pushing that agency’s 
final decision in a different direction, why not the President’s overall goals 
for national policy?  In short, the difficulty faced by an agency official in 
applying this interpretation of statutory language to close cases means that a 
simple delegation, even if it is interpreted as these commentators suggest, is 
unlikely to add more than a touch of calcium to the agency official’s bones. 
100
Second, the agency official still has practical control of the institution 
that must, in the first instance, develop the record supporting the rule 
(whether it is automotive fuel efficiency standards or contaminated site 
cleanup standards), either because the statute names the agency or the 
President has delegated the authority to the agency by executive order.  The 
  The agency official’s view of what that law requires—and 
what reasons best satisfy the law—will surely also influence the official’s 
willingness to accede to presidential influence, and that understanding is 
likely to be clearer than identifying whether presidential influence has 
overstepped the line of “direction.” 
 
 98. Cf. Sargentich, supra note 3, at 21 (“[T]he distinction between presidential 
influence, supervision, advice, and persuasion on the one hand, and controlling, displacing, 
commanding, and directing on the other, can be subtle in practice.”). 
 99. Percival, supra note 4, at 998. 
 100. Percival describes, for example, an HHS Secretary’s successful argument to 
President George H.W. Bush that his desired policy choice was not supported by the 
rulemaking record. Id. at 994–95. 
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White House needs the cooperation of the agency official, including the 
staff and resources at her disposal, and this represents an ongoing incentive 
for the White House to negotiate with agency staff, rather than to direct.101
Third, if the statute contains a simple delegation, the statute’s plain 
language probably precludes the President from signing a Federal Register 
notice if the agency official does not, even if the simple delegation is 
interpreted to include presidential directive authority.  (In the event of a 
presidential delegation redelegated to an agency official, the President 
would have to revoke the delegation to sign the Federal Register notice.
 
102)  
This, too, gives the agency official some leverage, though one implication 
of the textual analysis above is that it may not be leverage specifically 
intended by Congress.103
Finally, whatever the simple delegation’s interpretation, the agency 
official retains leverage in a particular case to inflict political costs on the 
President by resigning in protest or by forcing the President to fire her.
  
104  
Whether a President’s pressure amounts to impermissible directive 
authority or pressuring influence—and even if the statute says “President” 
and the agency official has received the power by delegation—the agency 
official can respond, “I won’t do it; you will have to fire me.”  Strauss 
alludes to two agency officials who told “‘the President to pound sand . . . 
[and] the President knew they had the political capital to win.’”105
Strauss also recounts the story of President Andrew Jackson’s efforts to 
get two Treasury Secretaries to remove the government’s funds from the 
National Bank and deposit them in state banks.  The Secretaries refused and 
had to be removed.  Ultimately, Jackson appointed Roger B. Taney Acting 
Secretary, and Taney complied, resulting in a “political furor” and a Senate 
Resolution of Censure against Taney.  Strauss argues that this narrative in 
  Without 
knowing the circumstances at hand, we cannot know for sure whether the 
statutes these officials were enforcing contained simple delegations directly 
to the agency official.  More critically, the public is highly unlikely to know 
that information.  Either way, the officials could impose the same political 
costs on the President. 
 
 101. Cf. Kagan, supra note 12, at 2272–73 (noting that Presidents Richard Nixon and 
Jimmy Carter both viewed themselves as being surrounded by hostile and unresponsive 
bureaucracies). 
 102. Such a revocation would be highly unusual, and I have not succeeded in locating 
one.  
 103.  Cf. Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1544, 
1546 (9th Cir. 1993) (prohibition on ex parte contacts applied to President when formal 
adjudication decision vested in other agency officials despite arguments that the President is 
the “center of the Executive Branch”). 
 104. See Sargentich, supra note 3, at 8 (“There is an outer limit on the number or 
frequency of terminations that any administration can tolerate without suffering the negative 
political repercussions of instability.”). 
 105. Strauss, supra note 1, at 736; see also Percival, supra note 4, at 995 (reporting that 
Federal Drug Administration Administrator Kessler and HHS Secretary Sullivan were 
prepared to resign over dispute with the White House on content of nutritional disclosure 
rule). 
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part illustrates Jackson’s acceptance of the proposition that “his control lay 
only over the officeholder and was not a power of decision.”106  The 
narrative also illustrates, however, the power of top agency officials to 
inflict political costs on the President by forcing him to remove them.  In 
Percival’s words, when an executive officer refuses to follow the 
President’s preferences, it serves “as an alarm signal to the public that the 
president may not be acting with fidelity to the law or in the best interest of 
the country.”107
The hero of this type of story is the agency official who stands up for the 
right decision, even at the significant personal cost of losing her job.  The 
wording of the statute changes little, if anything at all, about either the 
President’s ability to remove the official or the agency official’s ability to 
force her to that point.  And the official may gain the sense of gratification 
that comes with knowing he or she has done the right thing, as well as 
public accolades and the respect of his or her peers. 
 
Regarding the official’s ability to resist inappropriate presidential 
pressure or positions, other features of the agency official’s position might 
be just as important as whether the statute says “Administrator” or 
“President” (delegated through Executive Order to the “Administrator.”).  
Consider a recent statement from Professor Jack Goldsmith, former head of 
the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel, and now well-known 
for standing up to White House officials: 
It’s important that there be a Senate-confirmed person at the head of the 
Office of Legal Counsel, both because it helps secure the independence of 
the office when it’s making legal judgments and because it helps give the 
office more authority, both within the Justice Department and throughout 
the government.108
Top agency officials, of course, generally possess this imprimatur of 
authority.
 
109
 
 106. Strauss, supra note 
 
1, at 707 n.56; see id. at 706–07 nn.47–57. 
 107. Id. at 963. 
 108. Carrie Johnson, Obama Picks New Nominee for Legal Counsel’s Office, NPR, Jan. 
5, 2011, http://www.npr.org/2011/01/05/132681380/obama-picks-new-nominee-for-legal-
counsels-office (quoting former Office of Legal Counsel head Jack Goldsmith on the 
nomination of Virginia Seitz to head the office).  Goldsmith authored The Terror 
Presidency, recounting his attempt to stand up to the George W. Bush White House. See 
generally Strauss, supra note 1, at 718 (“[P]olitical obligations to the Senate, even promises 
made, may create back-currents that can stiffen resolve against presidential prodding.”); 
Jeffrey Rosen, Conscience of a Conservative, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 9, 2007, at 40 
(profiling Goldsmith). 
 109. See generally Anne Joseph O’Connell, Vacant Offices:  Delays in Staffing Top 
Agency Positions, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 913, 913–14 (2009) (“[O]ver 1100 Senate-confirmed 
presidential appointees are supposed to run [federal] agencies and direct these policy 
decisions, comprising a small but critically important component of a federal workforce of 
over 2.5 million employees.”). 
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B.  Addressing Presidential Supervision Directly 
Finally, it is worth focusing on why the interpretive issue has prompted 
so much debate, given the lack of statutory clarity on the question.  The 
interpretive argument made by Stack, Strauss, Sargentich, and Percival, if 
accepted, theoretically empowers agency officials to resist the White 
House’s growing assertions of power to control the agencies.  As I have 
argued, however, statutes with simple delegations to executive agency 
officials cannot generally be read to communicate a distinctive intent 
regarding presidential directive authority, compared with a typical 
presidential delegation.  And even reading simple delegations this way may 
not particularly strengthen an agency official’s hand against the President.  
Meanwhile, other features of the executive branch, the statutes, and the 
President-agency relationship may offer support for an agency official in 
resisting presidential policy preferences she sees as wrong. 
Ultimately, then, interpreting the term “Secretary” or “Administrator” 
will not resolve the question whether the President should be directing an 
executive branch agency’s actions.  As we assess the broader question of 
the desirable scope of presidential control, we should put the textual 
question aside; greater disclosure and assessment of the effects of 
presidential control would be a more useful approach. 
As has been widely noted, Presidents have been claiming ever-increasing 
power to supervise decisions traditionally developed primarily in the 
agencies.  That has raised concerns, particularly to the extent that oversight 
operates to displace or dismiss valuable agency experience and expertise 
that has developed over long periods of time.110
Further, as Strauss has argued, agency decision making may have 
significant institutional advantages compared with presidential or White 
House decision making.  For example, presidential directive authority is 
likely to mean, practically, not that the President herself makes the decision, 
but rather that the decision will be made “within an apparatus of a few 
thousand White House employees” in a relatively opaque institution “in 
contrast to a decision reached by a politically accountable agency 
administrator with the help of a more extensive and expert staff operating 
under those conditions of enhanced transparency and procedural 
regularity.”
  That oversight could 
displace agency expertise either in the context of a particular decision or in 
an agency’s determination of which issues deserve top priority.  
111
 
 110. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 
  As Strauss argues, an agency notice and comment 
rulemaking process is surely more public than comparatively opaque White 
House deliberations, and agency officials are more available for 
92, at 1141–44 (outlining types of presidential 
pressure that “seem clearly out of bounds”). 
 111. Strauss, supra note 1, at 753; see also id. at 754 (The “President’s will” will often be 
a “bolt of lightning hurled by one unelected operative” with more political pressure, less 
staff support, stretched expertise, and fewer obligations of procedural regularity, compared 
with “another unelected operative enjoying significant virtues from a rule-of-law 
perspective.”). 
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congressional oversight hearings than the President, although the President 
and her staff might reasonably be understood to be more politically 
accountable through the electoral process.112  One risk here is that well-
organized interest groups may have particular access to the White House, or 
that the White House may have a particular axe to grind that should not be 
seen as relevant to the policy decision.113
These arguments, only briefly summarized here, all suggest that 
presidential authority over executive branch agencies tends to degrade, 
rather than to legitimate, decision making in the administrative state.  This 
is consistent with a concern occasionally expressed both in congressional 
hearings and in some court opinions about “raw politics” entering agency 
decision making.
 
114  As I have argued elsewhere, moreover, a President 
certainly should not be able to push an agency official to disregard legal 
requirements or to slant scientific findings either in deciding the content of 
a particular action or in deciding  that no action at all should be taken.115  
These issues are implicated in recent allegations regarding political 
manipulation of agency scientific research.116
Strauss, Sargentich, Stack, and Percival all argue persuasively that to the 
extent presidential power, whether to influence or direct, is misdirected, 
agency resistance can be a highly useful offset.  “The representation of 
  This “White House 
supervision,” to the extent it occurs, seems out of bounds. 
 
 112. See CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32397, FEDERAL 
RULEMAKING:  THE ROLE OF THE OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, 
SUMMARY (2009) (“[OMB] is part of the Executive Office of the President, and helps ensure 
that covered agencies’ rules reflect the President’s policies and priorities.”); Kagan, supra 
note 12, at 2338 (arguing that Office of Management and Budget/Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (OMB/OIRA) review is part of presidential supervision); Mendelson, 
supra note 92, at 1147. 
 113. See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory 
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1306 (2006) (suggesting President may be as susceptible to 
interest group pressures as agency is); see, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. 
Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State:  A Critical Look at the Practice of 
Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 85 (2006) (“According to 57% of EPA 
respondents, interest groups were sometimes able to persuade the White House to seek 
changes in EPA rule-makings, and 29% said often.”). But see Steven Croley, White House 
Review of Agency Rulemaking:  An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 882 
(2003) (“Nor does the White House appear to cater to certain types of interests and not 
others.”). 
 114. E.g., Sargentich, supra note 3, at 35 (“By being somewhat shielded from the political 
process, agencies arguably are well-suited to address difficult issues on the merits without 
constant intrusions of raw politics into the process.”); Stack, supra note 4, at 322 (“[W]e are 
better off with a conception of the agency official’s role that emphasizes the official’s 
independent duty under the law . . . . [and] it depends on the good judgment of those who 
exercise authority.”). 
 115. See Mendelson, supra note 92, at 1141 (arguing that “out of bounds” presidential 
pressure includes influence “that prompts the agency to ignore its factual or technical 
conclusions”). 
 116. See Holly Doremus, Scientific and Political Integrity in Environmental Policy, 86 
TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1603–19 (2008); Wendy Wagner & Rena Steinzor, Rescuing Science 
from Politics:  Regulation and the Distortion of Scientific Research, White Paper No. 604 
(Ctr. for Progressive Reform, 2006), available at http://www.progressivereform.org
/articles/Rescuing_Science_604.pdf. 
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diversity is a key attribute of a well-functioning system of checks and 
balances” that critiques the ratification of “the preferences of a single power 
center.”117  And, in Stack’s words, “the mere possibility of resistance [by 
an executive official] creates a legal check on presidential abuse internal to 
the executive branch:  [t]he President must persuade or fire the official, 
rather than simply bind that official to his views.”118  In the context of 
assessing the effects of personnel “burrowing” at the end of a Presidency, I 
have similarly argued that viewpoint diversity inside agencies, as well as 
the presence of civil service holdovers in relatively senior positions from 
previous administrations, can result in an agency considering a wider range 
of important viewpoints and the potential moderation, stabilization, and 
improvement of agency policies.119  As Neal Katyal has argued, the civil 
service can serve as an important check on executive power.120
But we simply do not know that White House supervision, or even 
direction, is all distorting or inappropriate and that, accordingly, we should 
want to maximize, at all costs, executive agency resistance.
 
121  Presidential 
supervision also has its well-recognized virtues—coordination, direction, 
and energy among them—and as Jerry Mashaw argued, the ability to take a 
national perspective.122  That perspective may be relatively lacking in 
Congress.123
Further, agency decision making is not flawless either.  Like presidential 
decision making, agency decision making can be irrational, myopic, or 
overly responsive to particular interest groups.
  Taking the broader view is clearly also valuable compared to 
the narrow jurisdictional view likely to be taken by the leadership of an 
individual agency. 
124
 
 117. Sargentich, supra note 
  Consider the scandal 
involving EPA official Rita Lavelle and EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch 
Burford during the Reagan years.  The Burford/Lavelle scandal, one of the 
biggest government scandals during that period, centered around allegations 
that the EPA’s Superfund hazardous waste cleanup program was tainted by 
conflicts of interest and managed for political purposes, and that the agency 
3, at 6. 
 118. Stack, supra note 4, at 316, 322; accord Sargentich, supra note 3, at 35. 
 119. See Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing:  Entrenching Policies and Personnel 
Before a New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 646 (2003); see also Nina 
Mendelson, Midnight Rulemaking and Congress, in TRANSITIONS (Austin Sarat ed., 
forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 13) (on file with author) (arguing that less policy making 
dialogue may take place inside White House compared with Congress). 
 120. See generally Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers:  Checking 
Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006). 
 121. See Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 113, at 50 (“[S]elective [presidential] 
intervention is not all bad.  It may comport with political priorities and even facilitate 
political accountability where it happens to exist.”). 
 122. JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE:  USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO 
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 152–53 (1997); accord THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander 
Hamilton). 
 123. See MASHAW, supra note 122, at 153. 
 124. See generally Nicholas Bagley, Agency Hygiene, 89 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO (2010), 
http://www.texaslrev.com/sites/default/files/seealso/vol89/pdf/89TexasLRevSeeAlso1.pdf 
(discussing measures to reduce “agency capture”). 
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negotiated “sweetheart deals” with companies responsible for hazardous 
waste cleanup.125  It is worth noting that although the White House 
disclaimed responsibility for the officials’ actions, the EPA was 
implementing a statute where the delegations ran almost entirely to the 
President.126  Rather than the agency officials avoiding accountability by 
blaming the President, this was, if anything, a situation where the President 
blamed the agencies and tried to distance himself from agency function.  In 
the words of a contemporaneous newspaper article, “The White House has 
consistently stated that it had minimal contact with the agency on the 
conduct of the toxic waste programs” although “White House contacts with 
Miss Lavelle when she was running the toxic waste programs were ‘far 
more extensive [than] either Ms. Lavelle or White House officials have 
acknowledged.’”127  After a variety of problems at EPA were publicly 
reported, White House officials announced that the White House “ha[d] 
begun keeping a close watch over the [EPA].”128
Commentators have also criticized agency decision making as sometimes 
flawed and shortsighted and as misallocating resources.  In his academic 
writings, Justice Breyer argued, for example, that three significant problems 
plagued agency decision making:  “tunnel vision,” randomness in agency 
selection of regulatory targets, and inconsistency among agency regulatory 
approaches.
 
129
Further, as I have argued elsewhere, there is nothing inherently 
delegitimizing about an agency considering reasons offered by elected 
officials—so-called “political reasons.”
  Presidential oversight and coordination may be valuable to 
offset these tendencies. 
130  As I have argued, whether those 
reasons prove problematic can depend on the content both of those reasons 
and of the question the agency must resolve.  Consider that within their 
broad delegations, agencies now receive from Congress the authority to 
resolve far more than technical questions.  The significant issues agencies 
resolve very often include what we might consider core questions of 
value—whether risks presented are “unreasonable”131
 
 125. See, e.g., Philip Shabecoff, Rita Lavelle Gets 6-Month Term and is Fined $10,000 
for Perjury, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1984, at A1 (Rita Lavelle charged with “favoritism to 
business and Republican political candidates and failure to use the $1.6 billion hazardous 
waste cleanup fund in a timely fashion to clean up toxic waste sites”). 
 or whether particular 
 126. See supra text accompanying notes 52–54 (discussing delegations to President in 
CERCLA).   
 127. House Report on E.P.A. Charges White House Still Withholds Data, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 31, 1984, at A13; accord C.M. Cameron Lynch, Note, Environmental Awareness and 
the New Republican Party:  The Re-Greening of the GOP?, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 215, 222 (2001) (describing Burford/Lavelle scandal). 
 128. Philip Shabecoff, White House Has E.P.A. on Political “Watch List”, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 14, 1982, at B11. 
 129. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE:  TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK 
REGULATION 11–29 (1993). 
 130.  See Mendelson, supra note 92, at 1141–46. 
 131. See 21 U.S.C. § 342(f)(1)(A) (2006) (regarding regulation of dietary supplements 
that present “significant or unreasonable risk of illness or injury”); 49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(8) 
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standards are “reasonably necessary or appropriate” to protect health.132  
These may require resolving debates about whether, say, the government 
should address known risks by setting standards and restricting the sale of 
products or whether disclosure of information is sufficient to make risks 
“reasonable” because consumers can make their own choices.133  Take the 
recent debate regarding whether the Department of Agriculture should 
permit New York City to restrict the use of federal food stamps to purchase 
sodas.  This issue that surely involves more than the impact of soda on 
nutritional health.134
A central argument for the legitimacy of the administrative state, 
including its priority-setting and resolution of value-laden questions,
 
135 has 
been that agencies are accountable to the President, who is in turn 
accountable to the electorate.  Agencies are thus more likely to be 
democratically responsive in resolving these questions of value.  Arguments 
that agency decisions can be seen as more legitimate because of presidential 
control have been thoroughly discussed elsewhere, including in my own 
work.136
I have recently argued elsewhere that if presidential influence is to serve 
any legitimating function for agency conduct, greater disclosure of the 
content of presidential supervision—even in abbreviated form—is 
essential.
  One obvious implication of this sort of argument, though, is that 
presidential supervision of agency decisions can be desirable and 
legitimating. 
137  Otherwise, the electorate may not fully understand the extent 
of actual or potential presidential supervision of agency decisions, 
particularly given presidential efforts to maintain “deniability.”138
 
(defining “motor vehicle safety” as performance in a way that “protects the public against 
unreasonable risk of accidents occurring”). 
  Under 
 132. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (“The term ‘occupational safety and health standard’ means 
a standard which requires conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices, means, 
methods, operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or 
healthful employment and places of employment.”). 
 133. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,563, § 4, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821, 3,822 (Jan. 18, 2011) 
(“[E]ach agency shall identify and consider regulatory approaches that reduce burdens and 
maintain flexibility and freedom of choice . . . .  These approaches include warnings . . . and 
disclosure requirements . . . .”). 
 134. See Anemona Hartocollis, Food Stamps as New Front in Soda Wars, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 7, 2010, at A1. 
 135. Strauss acknowledges that on issues of agenda setting, “one might find considerably 
greater room for the presumption of directorial authority.” Strauss, supra note 1, at 757. 
 136. See generally MASHAW, supra note 122, at 152–53 (describing presidential control 
model); Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration:  Rethinking Popular Representation in 
Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441 (2010) (criticizing presidential control model); 
Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed:  Against Simple Rules for a Complex 
World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987 (1997) (same); Cynthia R. Farina, False Comfort and 
Impossible Promises:  Uncertainty, Information Overload, and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 357 (2010) (same); Kagan, supra note_12, at 2339–40; Mendelson, supra 
note 92, at 1135–38 (describing and critiquing presidential control model). 
 137. See Mendelson, supra note 92, at 1146–59. 
 138. See id. at 1161–62; supra notes 124–27 and accompanying text. 
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these circumstances, holding the President accountable through the electoral 
process for actions of the administrative state will be doubtful at best. 
But the needed transparency is lacking.  Presidential influence over 
agency decision making, though it is extensive, remains surprisingly 
opaque.  Although the vast majority of significant agency rules are changed 
in the regulatory review process in OIRA, the content of OIRA influence 
over the regulatory review process is difficult to discern, as I have 
documented elsewhere.  That information is difficult to locate and 
systematically disclosed by neither OIRA nor the agency.139  And 
Presidents continue to choose to distance themselves from agency function 
even as they seek to influence it.  In January, 2011, for example, President 
Barack Obama wrote an op-ed that included a story of the EPA’s 
maintaining a hazardous designation for saccharin despite the FDA’s 
approval of it for consumption as he laid out principles for a “21st century 
regulatory system.”140
More to the point, greater disclosure also would help us assess the 
content of presidential influence over agencies and evaluate whether 
presidential influence should be seen as beneficial in the main, a vehicle for 
special interest pressure, or second-guessing to poor effect technical 
expertise that traditionally has resided in the agencies.  In turn, that could 
help inform legislation, particularly in the domestic policy setting, that 
actually does speak clearly to presidential supervision. 
  Greater disclosure would help the electorate better 
understand the extent of presidential control, as well as possibly helping to 
deter presidential influence that we would see as negative or corrupting of 
the agency decision-making process. 
CONCLUSION 
Strauss, Stack, Percival, and Sargentich have all argued that we should 
construe statutory delegations, where possible, to increase the ability of 
executive branch agency officials to resist presidential control.  An active 
policy dialogue within the executive branch that thoroughly engages both 
presidential and agency offices seems likely to prompt better overall 
decision making simply because a wider range of viewpoints will be 
expressed in such a deliberation.  And agency resistance offers something 
of a safeguard against misguided presidential decision making, as 
presidential supervision does in the case of agency decision making.  
Whether construing a simple delegation as limiting presidential directive 
authority would help increase agency resistance, as these commentators 
 
 139. Mendelson, supra note 92, at 1146–70.  A search of the OIRA review database on 
www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoHistoricReport, as well as a review of the results, revealed 
that of all economically significant rules for which review was completed in calendar year 
2010, not one of the 138 rules was reported as approved without change.  Results are on file 
with author.  Of the 138 rules identified in the search, 132 were reported as “approved 
consistent with change” or “withdrawn,” and six as “statutory or judicial deadline” without 
information on change. 
 140. See Barack Obama, Op-Ed., Toward a 21st Century Regulatory System, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 18, 2011, at A17. 
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argue, is far from clear, however.  And Kagan’s position that a simple 
delegation cannot generally be interpreted as a distinctive congressional 
effort to limit presidential direction is ultimately the more convincing 
position. 
It is also unclear whether the President ought to be the “decider” of a 
difficult question delegated by Congress to the executive branch or whether 
an executive agency official should make the final call.  In my view, that 
may depend on the question’s content—whether it is primarily technical or 
one of value.  It also may depend on the processes used in the agency, the 
White House, or both.  Rather than searching for meaning that turns out to 
be largely absent in the statutory texts, we should seek greater disclosure of 
presidential supervision to help us evaluate this question and potentially 
inform legislation that does speak specifically to whether Presidents may 
direct agency action. 
 
